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STRUCTURAL RIGHTS IN PRIVACY
Harry Surden*

This Essay challenges the view thatprivacy interests are protected primarily by law. Based upon the understanding that society relies upon nonlegal devices such as markets, norms, and structure to regulate human behavior, this Essay calls attention to a class of regulatory devices known as
latent structuralconstraints and provides a positive account of their role in
regulatingprivacy. Structural constraints are physical or technological barriers which regulate conduct; they can be either explicit or latent. An example of an explicit structural constraint is a fence which is designed to
prevent entry onto real property, thereby effectively enforcing property
rights. Latent structural constraints, by contrast, are the secondary costs
arisingfrom the technological state of the world which implicitly regulate
conduct by making certain activities too difficult to engage in on a widespread basis.
Society relies upon these latent structural constraints to reliably inhibit
certain unwanted conduct in a way that is functionally comparable to its
use of law. For example, society has frequently depended upon the search
costs involved in aggregatingand analyzing large amounts of information
to effectively protect anonymity. The operation of these latent structural
constraints is often implicit and therefore non-obvious to policymakers.
This focus on implicit, rights-like relationships which are protected by nonlegal constraints becomes significant because latent structural constraints
are vulnerable to sudden dissipation due to emerging technologies. This
Essay describes a conceptual framework by which policymakers can explore this association between constrained behavior and latent structural
constraints and suggests that they employ this conceptualizationin order to
identify non-obvious privacy interests which may be threatened by emerging technologies.
I.

INTRODUCTION

N this Essay, I generalize the logic underlying legal rights in order to
question the view that privacy is protected primarily by law. In the
traditional view, privacy rights are those positive legal rights which
* Fellow, Stanford Center for Computers and the Law, Stanford Law School; J.D.
Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Barbara Babcock, Andrew Coan, Richard Craswell,
George Fisher, Lawrence Lessig, and Mara Mintzer for their valuable comments and
suggestions.
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have been explicitly identified and instantiated by rule-makers.1 Viewing
the domain of privacy interests as coterminous with legal interests omits a
large category of significant but non-obvious privacy interests which are
regulated by other mechanisms. Importantly, from a public policy perspective, the choice of regulatory mechanism can have an impact on the
substantive quality of the regulated interest.
As the recent literature has observed, law is not the only means
through which society regulates human behavior. 2 Besides law, society
shapes the conduct of individuals using, among other devices, norms,
markets, and the real-world physical and technical limitations known collectively as structure. 3 These are the so-called non-legal regulatory devices. Although they are different in nature, these various mechanisms
share the common attribute that they constrain behavior by regulating
the costs of certain activities. 4 In many instances, these regulatory devices can be used interchangeably or in parallel for the purpose of achieving the same regulatory goal. 5 Law, therefore, can be seen as just one
instance of a class of constraint mechanisms that regulate behavior by
adjusting the cost of certain behaviors.
Legal theorists following Wesley Hohfeld have defined an individual
legal right in terms of a legal duty on the part of others to refrain from
particular behavior relative to the rights-holder. 6 In other words, a legal
right is created whenever a legal constraint prevents others from engaging in particular behaviors with respect to the rights-holder. 7 Combining
this definition with the observation that society often relies upon regulatory devices not rooted in law in order to constrain unwanted behaviors,
1. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databasesand Metaphors

for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (2001) ("Privacy law consists of a
mosaic of various types of law: tort law, constitutional law, federal and state statutory law,

evidentiary privileges, property law, and contract law.").
2. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behav-

ior, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 655, 657 (2006); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998).
3. See LAWRENCE LESSlG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 82-83 (1999)

(discussing how human behavior is moderated by other mechanisms besides law). A fence
is an example of a structural regulator. Rather than relying upon trespass law to keep
unwanted visitors from one's land, landowners often rely on the physical regulation that a

tall fence imposes. Lessig uses the term "architecture" to describe real-world limitations
on human behavior. Id. I will use the term "structure" instead, because I believe that the

term "architecture" might suggest intentional human design. The term "structure" encompasses regulators which are both the by-product of design and the by-product of the state
of the world.

4. This Essay focuses upon the cost-imposing, rather than the cost-reducing (subsidy)
aspects of regulatory devices.
5. See Lessig, supra note 2, at 686.
6. See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913). In Hohfeld's conception, one holds a legal right
when there is a general legal duty that others in the world refrain from certain behavior
that either interferes with some affirmative activity (a positive right) or takes away from
some activity (a negative right).
7. This focus of this Essay is the Hohfeldian negative right-the duty to refrain from
a particular behavior-rather than a positive right-the duty to engage in particular

behaviors.
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this Essay makes the point that under certain circumstances, this "right
by way of constraint" relationship can be generalized and applied to the
non-legal regulatory mechanisms as well.
In particular, whenever society appears to rely upon a non-legal constraint mechanism to reliably prohibit unwanted behavior in the place of
and as a substitutefor an explicit law, it is useful for policymakers to query
whether the non-legal constraint is implicitly protecting a "constraintright". 8 This constraint-right conceptualization is an analytical aid for reifying the explicit legal right that would have existed had society chosen
to use the legal regulatory mechanism to constrain the behavior. This
general schematic forms the basis of a paradigm that I call the constraintrights framework.
It is analytically helpful to think about the relationship between nonlegal regulators and constrained behaviors using the idiom of legal interests. Legal rights and the behaviors constrained by legal rules are explicit
and expressive. 9 By contrast, the regulation of behaviors through nonlegal mechanisms is often implicit and non-obvious.1 0 The constraintrights conceptualization highlights this relation between constraint and
behavior. In essence, the framework poses a thought experiment to
policymakers to expressly consider whether the implicitly regulated interest merits explicit regulation. This is especially important when there is a
risk that the non-legal regulator will suddenly cease to inhibit the
behavior.
In the privacy context, society implicitly relies upon non-legal regulators to prevent a large number of unwanted behaviors. Although positive
legal privacy rights are relatively easy to identify because they are enumerated in statutes and judicial doctrines, potential privacy interests protected by non-legal mechanisms may not be apparent to policymakers.
By the time these implicit rights-like relationships come to light in the
public discourse, it is often because these interests have already eroded.
Such interests tend to dissipate for the reason that not all constraint
mechanisms are equally effective at reliably preventing unwanted behavior due to their relative dependence on external factors. In particular,
this Essay focuses on privacy interests that are governed by structural
constraints and the corresponding "structural privacy rights" which they
may be protecting. Structural constraints are regulators of behavior that
prevent conduct through technological or physical barriers in the world.
These barriers make certain conduct costly." It is helpful to divide structural constraints into two categories-explicit and latent. To the extent
that these structural constraints are simply by-products of the technologi8. I use the term "society" here in a generic sense, referring to actions of formal or
informal institutions of public governance.
9. Cheng, supra note 2, at 659.

10. Id. at 662.
11. This Essay builds upon important insights from the existing privacy literature in
order to create a general conceptual framework to describe this dynamic. See LESSIG,
supra note 3, at 142-63 (providing some of the most important insights in this regard).
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cal or physical state of the world, rather than the result of design, they are
latent structural constraints. 12 The suite of behaviors that are permitted
and prohibited by latent structural costs given the default state of the
world can be thought of as conceptually similar to an initial distribution
of legal entitlements.
Importantly, latent structural constraints can lose their regulatory capability gradually due to exogenous factors, such as the emergence of new
technologies. This renders privacy interests which are solely protected by
latent structural constraints-so-called structural privacy rights-more
vulnerable to erosion than comparable legal rights.
In the second part of this Essay, I develop the constraint-rights framework in order to provide a vocabulary for exploring the puzzle of eroding
privacy interests. It flows from the arrangement in which there is a societal assumption that certain behaviors are reliably constrained by alternative regulators-such as structure-without need for explicit, legal rules
to moderate the conduct. I suggest that if policymakers adhere to the
conventional view in the privacy domain that privacy rights are coextensive with the set of explicit privacy laws and doctrines enumerated by
legal rule-makers, then they may be omitting a significant source of privacy interests from the public debate. This has implications upon the
question as to what policymakers should consider to be an existing privacy interest in the event that latent structural constraints that society
had been reliant upon suddenly fail to adequately inhibit a particular
behavior.
I also explore the major constraint mechanisms-laws, markets, norms,
and structure-across various characteristics that shape their ability to
regulate or prohibit behavior. In this way, I consider why some regulatory devices tend to be employed more than others in domains such as
privacy, where it is important to prevent rather than incrementally regulate unwanted conduct. I also discuss how these characteristics result in
sudden, discontinuous drops in regulation upon the dissipation of structural constraints.
Finally, I closely examine the important role of latent structural constraints in privacy law, providing a positive account of the recurring phenomenon of eroding interests and emerging technologies. This is what I
term the "structural rights/emerging technology dynamic." I emphasize
the way in which latent structural constraints-which are premised upon
cost inhibiting actions-are vulnerable to erosion by particular emerging
12. A simple example will illustrate the point. In today's world, there is an expectation that the contents of a closed bag will be private from onlookers. This expectation is
based upon the assumption that others cannot, from a distance, discern the contents of a
closed bag given the technological state of the world. Structural constraints-the physical
and technological costs imposed by the current state of the world-can be seen as constraining the conduct. Assuming that such behavior is socially undesirable from a privacy
perspective, society would not need to explicitly prohibit this behavior using the legal regu-

latory device. The structural constraint of cost serves as an adequate constraint on the
unwanted behavior.
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technologies that lower those inhibiting costs. To the extent that society
depends upon the presence of these costs to reliably inhibit a potential
privacy-violating activity, their dissipation results in a sudden regulatory
shift, leaving these interests unprotected. This framework can be used to
describe similar phenomena in other areas of law governed by latent
structural constraints and subject to emerging technologies, particularly
in the realm of intellectual property.
In Part III of this Essay, I illustrate this dynamic between structural
privacy interests and emerging technologies in the context of a contemporary privacy debate surrounding an emerging technology known as Radio
Frequency Identification ("RFID"). Using RFID as an illustrative vehicle, I examine a series of potential privacy interests that are protected
solely by latent structural constraints. The main conceptual point is that
the diffusion of this emerging technology can be seen as potentially eliminating implicitly regulated privacy interests. Rather than passively allowing the emergence of the technology to effectively cause a shift in
entitlements, I suggest that policymakers should closely examine the implicit privacy interests within the conceptual framework outlined in this
Essay to expressly determine whether they merit explicit governance by
another regulatory device. In particular, because of their vulnerabilities
to technology, it is useful for policymakers to identify structural privacy
interests before a particular cost-lowering technology becomes too
widespread.
In the fourth and final part of this Essay, I present a series of principles
for engaging in this identification task. I also explore these principles in
relation to the rhetoric of rights. In this, I hope to give a vocabulary to
discuss the above-described phenomenon-the potential loss of structural
privacy rights. Groups facing the loss of privacy interests which had been
implicitly protected by structural mechanisms but which are suddenly
threatened by the emergence of new technologies could use the familiar
language of rights to highlight this situation in the public discourse.
I also observe that, like laws, structural constraints are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive relative to the behavior they are attempting to
regulate. 1 3 That is, due to limits in the precision of constraining particular behaviors, structural constraints prevent both unwanted behavior as
well as other behaviors that are benign or even desirable. I therefore
suggest a means for more precisely targeting the undesirable behavior. In
this way, if the scenario arises in which a structural constraint no longer
adequately prevents a type of behavior due to an emerging technology,
society may choose to utilize an alternative constraint mechanism-such
as law-to continue to protect the privacy interest. Based upon the prin13. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89

HARV. L. REV. 1687 (1976). A speed limit provides a good example of a law being overinclusive relative to the behavior it is attempting to regulate. If the behavior regulated by a
speed limit is "safe driving," then a sixty-five miles per hour speed limit prevents some
behavior at sixty-seven miles per hour which is safe for the sake of administrability.
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ciples described, policymakers can target the undesirable behavior precisely, so that a new constraint mechanism does not have to be as overinclusive as the structural constraint it is replacing. Through this process
of precise targeting of behaviors, policymakers can reduce overall social
costs by permitting beneficial or benign behaviors while still constraining
conduct that is considered to violate privacy.
II.

CONSTRAINTS AS REGULATORS

A growing body of legal literature emphasizes the point that there are
14
multiple means by which society regulates human behavior besides law.
The concept of alternative behavior regulators extended from initial insights by the law and economics community on the effects of pricing upon
behavior.15 Recent scholars, notably Lawrence Lessig, have highlighted
the role of other, less obvious, regulatory mechanisms, including social
norms and physical or technological constraints.1 6 Under Lessig's formulation, there are four major categories of constraints that regulate behavior: laws, markets, social norms, and those constraints which are based
upon the physical and technological state of the world, which I collec17
tively refer to as "structural constraints."
The common thread among all of these regulatory mechanisms is that
they restrict or moderate the level of behavior by increasing (or reducing)
costs of certain activities.' 8 Markets use pricing mechanisms to impose
economic costs, social norms impose social costs, and law uses the threat
of sanctions to impose expected penal costs.1 9 Structural constraints impose physical or technological costs on behaviors. 20 Importantly, this cost
principle can be generalized: any mechanism which imposes costs on behavior can be seen as a device that society can use or rely upon to regulate behavior.
A.

A

FRAMEWORK OF CONSTRAINTS AND RIGHTS

From the perspective of regulating behavior, there is less that is exceptional about legal rights than what might appear at first blush. Policymakers often can select among one or more regulatory mechanisms to achieve
14. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 2, at 655-66; Lessig, supra note 2, at 661-63.
15.

Lessig, supra note 2, at 661-65.

16. Id. at 662-63.
17. Id. The paradigm of a legal constraint is a law which explicitly prohibits certain
behavior and provides a sanction for its violation-for example, a speed limit. Markets are
economic mechanisms which regulate through price-the higher the price of a particular
activity, typically, the less it will occur. Social norms are implicit or explicit social rules
about how to behave.
18. Viewed through this general lens of cost imposition, other regulatory mechanisms
come into view. Businesses are constrained by internal business policies, trade customs
and practices, and fear of loss of reputation within long-term professional relationships.
For more on this, see generally Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005).
19. Lessig, supra note 2, at 661-65.
20. James Gibson, Re-Reifying Data, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 163, 164-65 (2004).
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a particular regulatory goal. 2' In one case, rule-makers might decide to
enact an explicit law to moderate behavior; at another time, society might
choose to regulate using structural constraints. 22 Sometimes multiple
constraint mechanisms operate in parallel to constrain a particular behavior through different means. 23 To say that something is a legal right is
simply to say that society chose to utilize the legal constraint mechanism
to regulate the behavior, rather than rely upon one of the alternative reg24
ulatory devices.
With that perspective of constraints as interchangeable regulators in
mind, it is possible to generalize upon Wesley Hohfeld's famous formulation of a negative legal right. Hohfeld defined an individual "legal right"
in terms of how others are required to behave in relation to the rightsholder. 25 Somewhat counter-intuitively, Hohfeld did not define a "legal
right" in terms of the abilities that the rights-holderpossessed.2 6 Rather,
Hohfeld suggested that a negative legal right is created when others have
a legal duty to refrain from behaviors that interfere with the rightsholder. 27 This definition of a legal right, by way of reference to the restraint of particular conduct by others relative to the rights-holder, suggests a comparable relationship between the non-legal constraint
mechanisms and the behaviors that they restrain. 28 This generalization of
the Hohfeldian formulation, which I term for purposes of this Essay the
"constraint-rights framework", emphasizes that non-legal constraint
mechanisms may give rise to relationships between constraints and behaviors that are, in many respects, functionally equivalent to those rela29
tionships which give rise to legal rights.
In other words, since certain legal rights-negative individual rightsare defined by reference to behaviors that are constrained, it is analytically useful to conceive of the relationship between non-legal constraints
and the behaviors that they constrain as creating analogues to legal interests. To the extent that society relies upon a non-legal constraint, such as
structure, to inhibit behavior to reliably protect a "right" in place of or as
a substitute for a legal constraint that would have had to have been enacted to create an explicit legal right, the constraint-rights framework
21. See Cheng, supra note 2, at 657.
22. For a good discussion of this issue, see id. at 667-75 (emphasizing that society
often overlooks solutions which involve structural constraints in favor of legal constraints-legislation).
23. Often policymakers will regulate a particular behavior by using several constraint
mechanisms in parallel to buttress the overall regulatory effect. The paradigm example of
this is the earlier example of the fence-a structural constraint-and trespass laws-a legal
constraint-operating in parallel to prevent unauthorized entry onto private land.
24. Given that any one of a number of constraint mechanisms could have been selected to achieve a particular regulatory goal, there is arguably a disproportionate focus
upon legal constraints regulating behavior.
25. Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 16-25; Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 986.

26. Singer, supra note 25, at 986.
27.
28.

Id.
See id.

29. Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 16-25.
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suggests that policymakers should expressly query whether a corresponding rights-like relationship-a constraint-right-has been established.
This analytical framework has practical implications in that it is easy to
overlook rights-like relationships that are not based in express laws. Importantly, it is also often the case that society's reliance upon non-legal
regulators results, not from conscious deliberation on the part of policymakers, but arbitrarily, given the default state of the world in which these
non-legal regulators already adequately constrain unwanted behaviors.
This is particularly true in the case of latent structural constraints, society's dependence upon which occurs, more often than not, simply as an
artifact of the technological state of the world. Such implicit regulation
lacks the normative or signaling capabilities of positive law. The constraint-rights framework is therefore of particular importance in the
realm of privacy, where many unwanted behaviors are implicitly con30
strained not by law, but through latent structural constraints.
B.

PRIVACY INTERESTS EXPANDED: CONSTRAINT-RIGHTS AND

LEGAL RIGHTS

In the traditional view of privacy, the relevant set of privacy rights are
those positive legal rules and doctrines which have been explicitly enumerated by legal rule-makers. 3 1 However, a key observation is that many
privacy interests are protected not by positive legal prohibitions on behavior, but by structural constraints which act as reliable substitutes for
32
legal constraints.
As indicated earlier, explicit structural constraints are the costs imposed by intentionally created physical or technological features in the
world. 33 We can think about two different types of structural constraints-explicit and latent structural constraints. The paradigm example
of an explicit structural regulator is a physical fence surrounding a piece
of property. In that scenario, a certain behavior-entering the property-is constrained by the physical cost that would be incurred by climbing or otherwise circumventing the fence. Another example of an explicit
structural constraint is a computer encryption algorithm, which, through
technological means, encodes information in such a way that decoding it
is difficult and often nearly impossible. This encryption imposes a high
technological cost upon the behavior of accessing the underlying
34
information.
30. Whether a particular behavior is "privacy violating" is a policy issue, as I will discuss in Part III.
31. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 1, at 1430.
32. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 56, 62-64 (1999).
33. Id. Lessig's important insight was to highlight the indirect and often unintended
regulatory effects that occur as the result of selecting particular technological or physical
structural designs.
34. Buildings, highways, and natural features such as mountains and rivers can be seen
as implicit structural constraints on behavior. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as
Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1041, 1047 (2002).
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Latent structural constraints, by contrast, are the secondary costs arising from the current technological or physical state of the world. The
presence of these costs implicitly regulates conduct. 35 Under the existing
technological state of the world, certain activities are so costly in terms of
resources and effort so as to render them effectively impossible to carry
out on a widespread basis. 36 To illustrate, take the example of the unauthorized sequencing of an individual's DNA to determine susceptibility to
certain diseases. As of the time of publication of this Essay, one can view
this search behavior as functionally prevented by latent structural constraints; namely, the large amount of resources required to conduct such
an analysis. The existence of these costs can be seen as inhibiting the
sequencing behavior. As long as these costs persist, society can avoid explicitly regulating this behavior, relying on these latent structural constraints to constrain the conduct. Policy decisions are made-or not
made-based upon assumptions about what behaviors are thought to be
possible or costly given the current technological state of the world. In
this case, this implicit regulation is directly linked to the rapidly changing
37
state of the technology, resulting in a rather fragile constraint.
It is helpful to examine the idea of regulation by latent structural constraints in the context of a contemporary privacy interest. Privacy is frequently defined as the ability to control information about oneself. 38 For
illustrative purposes, I will focus upon the example of private information-social security numbers and financial data -appearing within public documents, such as the records of court proceedings. 39 We can
describe this privacy interest as the right to be free from others finding
40
and using this sensitive personal information.
Traditionally, what would have protected such interests would have
been latent structural constraints, rather than legal constraints. A typical
court case can generate hundreds or thousands of individual documents.
Each of these documents within the public record can be tens or hundreds of pages in length. In the not-too-recent past, these documents
were not available electronically. The act of finding a particular piece of
information in a public record would have required a physical visit to the
public records office, followed by multiple requests to a records clerk for
large physical files. This would have been followed by a labor-intensive
search for particular words through thousands of pages of documents.
35. Gibson, supra note 20, at 164.
36. Id. at 164-65.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049, 1050 (2000); Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look
at the Costs of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 2, 91 5 (2000), http://stlr.stanford.edu/stlr/articles/00-stir-2 (defining privacy as "the
ability to prevent other people or companies from using, storing, or sharing information

about you").
39. I use this example simply for illustrative purposes. Whether this is an example of
an actual privacy interest is a public policy question.
40. See Walker, supra note 38, 1 5.
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Although it was not impossible to conduct such a search, the costs involved effectively constrained such searching behavior for most widespread, privacy-protecting purposes. Frequent, arbitrary, and widespread
searches of this nature were too costly to occur on a regular basis.
In this example, the privacy interest-the freedom from having others
glean sensitive personal information from public records-was adequately protected by latent structural constraints. Society relied upon an
alternative regulatory mechanism-structure-to constrain the behavior
as a substitute for what could have been explicitly regulated by law. Note
that with the advent of electronically searchable court documents available on public websites, the structural privacy rights calculus changed.
Many similar examples of private information protected by the obscuring
effects of search costs exist in the privacy realm.
There are functional reasons that impede policymakers from intuitively
recognizing these alternative, rights-like relationships under the orthodox
rights framework. Legal privacy rights are explicit and more readily discernable from a cognitive standpoint; the fact that certain behaviors are
prevented or constrained by non-explicit regulatory mechanisms is more
difficult to observe. Moreover, once a particular constraint mechanism is
successfully employed, policymakers may be unaware or indifferent as to
the details of the regulatory mechanism employed as long as it reliably
constrains the unwanted behavior. In other words, as long as some mechanism is acceptably constraining unwanted behavior, the underlying issue
and the choice of mechanism will garner little attention. This realization
dampens the temptation to conclude that the absence of explicit legal
protection for a particular set of privacy interests indicates an affirmative
decision on the part of society to leave such interests unprotected. Similarly, it is not always clear, in a given instance, whether the use of a latent
structural constraint as the sole regulator of a privacy interest resulted
from conscious deliberation on the part of policymakers to leave that interest legally unprotected or was simply as a by-product of the default
condition of the world.
Although sometimes policymakers may be indifferent as to the particular means through which unwanted behaviors are regulated, in certain
cases, the choice of a particular constraint mechanism becomes important, because not all constraint mechanisms are equivalent in terms of
regulatory ability. 41 Some regulatory mechanisms-especially structural
constraints-exhibit attributes which render them significantly less durable regulators than legal constraints. 42 Given that a great deal of privacy
is protected by structural, rather than legal, constraints, privacy rights
may be therefore disproportionately more vulnerable to erosion than
other types of rights. In the next subpart, I compare constraint mechanisms across varying dimensions, exploring why interests that are pro41. See Lessig, supra note 2, at 662-64.
42. See id. at 666-80.
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tected by some constraint mechanisms may be relatively more fragile
than others.
C.

COMPARING DIFFERENT CONSTRAINT MECHANISMS

AS REGULATORS

In general, the existing literature has treated the major constraint
43
mechanisms-law, markets, norms, and structure-as distinct species.
However, it makes sense to view them from a higher level of generalityas simply constraints-in order to evaluate them across various attributes
that determine their regulatory ability. In particular, this subpart will focus on the characteristics of structural constraints. In this way, we can see
weaknesses that some of the constraint mechanisms exhibit and explore
the notion that the quality of the underlying interest is affected by the
choice of the constraint mechanism.
Structural constraints are often characterized by the following two at44
tributes: low violability and the ability to engage in self-enforcement.
"Violability" refers to the degree to which it is possible to violate a particular constraint-to engage in the constrained activity despite the presence of the constraint. 45 Low-violability constraints tend to fully prevent
certain types of conduct ex-ante by creating significant costs that effectively limit the range of possible behaviors. High-violability constraints,
by contrast, do not preclude the possibility of engaging in the constrained
conduct, but carry the threat of imposed costs at a later time. The structural constraints that are the focus of this Essay tend to be somewhat
dichotomous and binary in the sense that their presence creates two distinct behavioral states rather than a continuum of possible degrees of behavior. 46 The first state is one in which the behavior is essentially
and the other in which the behavinhibited in the presence of a constraint
47
ior is unhindered in its absence.
This point about low-violability is best illustrated by structural constraints based in technology. Computer programs frequently contain
complex rules about which actions are allowable in the system. Such
rules may be explicit and declarative or implied in the logical structure of
the computer program. Rules such as these can be seen as structural constraints on conduct within the system, since typically a system will not
permit behavior that runs directly counter to its rules. Within the context
of the computer system, such technological structural constraints are essentially inviolable. The system will not permit partial or incremental vi43. See id. at 662-63.
44. See generally Cheng, supra note 2, at 664-67 (discussing a similar characterization).
45. See generally id. at 664.

46. Id. Strictly speaking, regulatory devices are not solely for constraining unwanted
behavior. Society also uses regulatory devices to encourage, subsidize, or require other,
wanted, behaviors. While it would be interesting, in future work, to explore similar analogues to these affirmative devices, that is not the focus of this Essay.
47. Id. at 664-65.
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olations of the constrained behavior. Instead, the computer system simply
will not allow the regulated behavior to occur in the presence of the rule.
By contrast, it is possible to violate nearly all laws. Legal constraints,
therefore, exhibit high-violability. A law can only deter behavior based
upon the expected cost of sanctions. In fact, economists suggest that
violations of a law will occur if the expected benefits from violating the
law outweigh the expected costs. 48 This expected cost is the probability of
having the violation detected and the probability of having the sanction
49
enforced via conviction, multiplied by the penalty itself.
To better illustrate this contrast, imagine the task of regulating speeding in motor vehicles. 50 One approach could involve the use of direct
legal constraints-speed limits and prospective legal sanctions. 5 1 These
sanctions could be designed such that the penalties increase as the level
of unwanted behavior increases. In such a case, there may be the threat
of small monetary fines in the event of smaller violations and progressively greater sanctions as the violations increase. In this scenario, it is
possible to engage in the unwanted behavior with the constraining effect
of the legal rules resulting from expected ex-post sanctions.
Another approach to this regulatory issue could involve structural constraints. 52 One could thus imagine an explicit technological rule built into
an automobile's computer system which limited the maximum speed of
the vehicle to a particular value-say 100 miles per hour.5 3 In the presence of such a structural constraint, and assuming the inability to circumvent the limitation, the speeding behavior could thus be prevented exante, rather than incrementally deterred. In this scenario, the structural
constraint is not only self-enforcing-the constraint itself has the ability
to detect and prevent violations-it is non-violable.
This contrast highlights a key point of this Essay-that the nature and
quality of the underlying interest can change substantially depending
upon the particular constraint mechanism that is employed to regulate
the behavior. A world in which particular behaviors are completely prevented ex-ante is substantively different from one in which those behaviors are possible, but simply deterred. In a certain sense, structural
regulators can be seen as stronger constraints, in that they can provide a
stronger version of negative rights by completely restraining the unwanted behavior that characterizes the right. Thus, a legal right to anonymity of data is arguably weaker than a right to anonymity that is
protected by a latent, but essentially inviolable structural constraint.
Because of their low-violability and self-enforcement ability- structural
constraints are particularly useful regulatory choice when the goal of soci48. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 176 (1968).
49. Id. at 177.
50. Cheng, supra note 2, at 681-88.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 689-93.
53. See id. at 691 (discussing a similar point).
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ety is to prevent rather than moderate a behavior. 5 4 In the realm of
privacy, society may be more interested in outright preventing, rather
than simply incrementally deterring, intrusions. However, this strength
of structural constraints also contains a weakness. Since structural constraints employ costs and barriers to regulate, anything that tends to reduce these costs or undermine these barriers significantly reduces their
regulatory effectiveness. This often results in sudden and discontinuous
loss of regulatory ability on the part of structural constraints, a characteristic not typically evidenced by the other constraint mechanisms. This
rapid decrease in regulation by structural constraints is why it is important to reify their implicit regulation. Interests protected solely by structural constraints may be less durable over time, and the shift in regulation
is often abrupt.
D.

THE STRUCTURAL RIGHTS/EMERGING TECHNOLOGY DYNAMIC

The previous subpart made the point that there are consequences to
particular choices of regulatory constraint mechanisms-whether law,
structure, norms, or markets-due to differing attributes that tend to
characterize the various governance devices. In this subpart, I explore
the way in which structural constraints and the correlative structural interests that they protect may be more vulnerable to dissipation than comparable constraint rights which could have arisen out of law, norms, or
market constraints. In particular, latent structural constraints are susceptible to weakening by emerging technologies. This recurring phenomenon is what I term the structural rights/emerging technology dynamic.
To the extent that society is reliant upon latent structural constraints to
prevent privacy-violating behavior, there exists the potential for problematic erosion of privacy. Numerous works in the existing literature have
observed the impact of technology on privacy. The work of Lessig in
particular has been extremely influential in highlighting the role of
55
emerging technologies in changing the balance in privacy interests.
Others have noted that privacy rights appear to erode over time in the
face of new technical capabilities. 56 This Essay suggests that the observed
phenomenon is a manifestation of a general pattern and attempts to describe this dynamic in a general manner by way of the constraint-rights
conceptual framework.
The dynamic proceeds as follows: society relies upon latent structural
constraints to prevent behavior that would otherwise be considered pri54. See id at 662-68.
55. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 142-63. Others have noted the reoccurring impact of technology on privacy. See, e.g. Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The
Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089

(1969).
56. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 264-66 (2002); Daniel Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1228-30

(2003).
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vacy-violating. This reliance upon existing, latent structural constraints to
regulate behavior can be seen as analogous to an implicit, initial distribution of entitlements in the Coasean sense. 5 7 Society's dependence upon
structural constraints rather than other constraint mechanisms to protect
privacy rests upon assumptions about the technological state of the world.
To use the earlier example of private information in paper court records:
the physical costs of obtaining the court documents and the difficulty of
searching through large amounts of paper documents for one particular
piece of information acted as sufficient constraints on the privacy violating activity.
Since the latent structural constraints are simply the costs imposed by
the physical or technological state of the world, then their ability to constrain behavior is weakened by anything which tends to lower those costs.
Importantly, many emerging technologies possess exactly this characteristic-the tendency to lower transactional and operational costs. This in
turn permits conduct which was previously costly or impossible. Consequently, a side-effect of many emerging technologies is the elimination of
structural privacy interests through cost reduction. The costs lost are
those that previously acted as latent structural constraints-the activity
costs that society was relying upon to constrain unwanted behaviors. This
dynamic-an emerging technology enabling previously impossible behavior-is a recurring pattern in the realm of privacy.
One can restate this dynamic in terms of this Essay's constraint-rights
framework as follows: In the world prior to the emergence of the technology, society relied upon a non-legal regulator to prevent unwanted privacy-violating behavior. It is useful to conceptualize this arrangement as
having produced a corresponding constraint-right that is analogous to the
positive legal right that would have been created had society regulated
the behavior through the use of an explicit rule. This conceptualization
allows policymakers to identify privacy rights which are non-obvious because they are implicitly protected by non-legal constraint mechanisms.
With the widespread diffusion of a disabling technology there is effectively a rights-shift. The default state of the world changes from one in
which the structural privacy interest was adequately protected to a world
in which the privacy interest is no longer protected. Assuming that there
is no parallel constraint mechanism-law, norms, or markets-to continue to safeguard the privacy right, this phenomenon can be seen as the
loss of a previously held right. In Hohfeldian terms, the emerging technology has effectively caused a shift from a structural right scenario to a
structural no-right scenario. 58
57. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960).

Although I do not explore the Coasean implications of initial distributions of structural
rights and transaction costs in this Essay, this would be a fruitful topic for further research.
An initial intuition is that the dichotomous and binary nature of structural rights make for
substantial transaction costs such that it is difficult to bargain around initial rights
distributions.
58. See Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 30.
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To illustrate the point, imagine that the privacy interest in question had
instead been protected by an explicit law rather than by a latent structural constraint. The implicit rights-shift can be seen as functionally comparable to a scenario in which policymakers affirmatively decided to
abrogate the privacy law. In that case, there would be no confusion as to
the fact that the former rights-holders were deprived of a legal right that
they once had. The difference is that this implicit rights-shift is based
upon exogenous factors -emerging technology-rather than affirmative
societal action.
Emphasizing the parallel nature of this implicit rights-shift, relative to
the more visible activity of society's enactment and removal of explicit
privacy laws, is one of the intended contributions of this Essay. This comparison has rhetorical consequences: Once a structural constraint has
eroded, policymakers can elect to use another constraint mechanismsuch as a law-to continue to protect the eroded privacy interest. The
affirmative use of another regulatory device can be framed as the continuation of a previously existing right, rather than the creation of an entirely new legal right. Such a distinction becomes important ix the public
policy debate over protecting privacy interests where the creation of a
new privacy right may prove politically more difficult than the protection
of an existing right.
Even when there is a parallel constraint mechanism in place-for example, a legal or normative constraint that persists after the absence of
the structural constraint-there may be a significant change on the nature
of the underlying interest. As the previous subpart noted, the characteristics of the constraint mechanisms employed can affect the quality of the
right. Thus, a violable legal constraint may be less effective at preventing
particular behaviors than a prior structural constraint which was non-violable. Such a shift to a relatively weaker form of protection can be seen
as somewhat analogous to the substantive effects resulting from changes
from property to liability rules. 59 The ability to prevent or "enjoin" the
unwanted behavior can lessen with a change from a structural to a nonstructural regulator.
For comparative purposes, it is worth noting that this same dynamic has
60
Copyright
been seen repeatedly in the realm of intellectual property.
laws were based upon assumptions about the structural difficulty of copying-for example, the costs involved in duplicating and disseminating creative works. Prior to the widespread dissemination of copying machines,
the duplication of texts and photos was a laborious and costly process,
typically requiring expensive equipment that put such capabilities out of
the reach of the public. These costs of duplication operated as latent
59. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996), (discussing the implications of property
rules and liability rules).
60. For a good discussion of similar issues in the intellectual property context, see
Gibson, supra note 20.
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structural constraints, thereby regulating the unwanted behavior of copying works. This was a state of the world upon which policymakers were
able to rely, although sometimes they did so in parallel with explicit legal
regulations prohibiting the copying behavior. Emerging technologies
such as photocopying machines, personal computers, and the Internet
dramatically lowered these duplication and distribution costs. The recent
imposition of technological limitations on copying and distribution, collectively known as digital rights management ("DRM"), 61 can be seen as
an effort to duplicate the lost latent structural protections through the
affirmative use of technical structural constraints. Although much of the
framework outlined can be applied to the realm of intellectual property,
this Essay will primarily focus on the privacy domain, where the issues of
structural protection are less intuitively clear.
III.

THE STRUCTURAL PRIVACY RIGHT/EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY DYNAMIC APPLIED

To render these concepts more tangible, I will illustrate the structural
privacy rights/emerging technology dynamic using a contemporary technology that exemplifies this relationship-Radio Frequency Identification
("RFID"). RFID is a rapidly emerging technology. In the next subpart, I
will briefly describe the technology, and then situate RFID within the
constraint-rights framework that this Essay has formulated by exploring
the unintended consequences of its technological diffusion on non-legalstructural-privacy interests. Consistent with the thesis of this Essay,
RFID lowers the costs of particular behaviors, and in those instances in
which society had relied upon those costs as a behavioral constraint as a
substitute for a legal constraint, the erosion of structural privacy rights
occurs.
A.

AN EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND ITS EFFECTS ON STRUCTURAL
PRIVACY RIGHTS: RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION

RFID is an auto-identification technology which uses miniature "tags"

62
to transmit identifying information about objects using radio waves.

The purpose of RFID and other auto-identification technologies-such
as the familiar Universal Product Code ("UPC") barcodes-is to allow
computers to acquire information about physical objects in the real world
to which the identifier label or tag is attached. 63 UPC barcodes, for example, are attached to most items purchased in retail stores and serve the
61. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair
Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60-65 (2006).
62. SANJAY E.SARMA, STEPHEN A. WEIS & DANIEL W. ENGELS, AUTO-ID CENTER,
RFID SYSTEMS, SECURITY AND PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS, 1, 3-4 (2002), http://www.autoid

labs.org/single-view/dir/article/6/122/page.html.
63. i2mobilesolutions, Auto ID and the Bar Code, http://www.paratech.co.uk/autoidandthebarcode.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2007) (noting that "[tihe term auto ID covers a
number of different technologies that enable computers to automatically identify an item,
usually by reading data from it .... [Clompanies have developed technologies like bar
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purpose of communicating to checkout computers identifying information about items being purchased; this is so that the computer can determine the price that should be charged. Similarly, RFID tags are attached
to physical items and can communicate identifying information about the
using radio
nature of the tagged item to a computer system over the air,
64
waves instead of through physical scanning of the barcode.
An example contrasting RFID with the UPC system will best illustrate
the novelty of RFID technology. 65 At a supermarket, a UPC system typically requires a customer to unload every purchased item onto a conveyor
belt so that a clerk can pick up each item in order to physically pass that
item's UPC barcode over a laser so that the checkout computer can de66
termine the price to charge. This is a costly, time-consuming process.
A supermarket using an RFID system would, instead of physically scanning UPC codes, employ small RFID "tags" which are attached to each
individual item. These "tags" are simply low-powered radio transmitters
which are capable of sending information about the product using radio
waves to a computer several feet away. Since RFID uses radio waves
rather than lasers to communicate information, no line-of-site between
the reader and the item is required, and identifying information can be
exchanged from several feet away. Using RFID, a supermarket could, in
theory, process the entire contents of a shopping cart without ever having
the clerk or the customer remove an item from a cart. 67 Each item in the
cart would instead radio information about itself from within the cart to
the checkout computer. Another familiar example of RFID in everyday
use is electronic toll collection systems, which use RFID tags to allow
drivers to pay for highway passage without stopping by wirelessly transmitting identifying information about the tag-holder to a receiver at the
68
toll booth.
All RFID systems consist of three main components: tags, readers, and
codes, RF (radio frequency) tags, magnetic stripe, smart card, optical character recognition
(OCR), optical mark readers (OMR).") .
64. See SARMA, WEIS & ENGELS, supra note 62, at 3-4. For example, in the case of
building security, a typical system might involve a security card carried by an authorized
user. The user may have to swipe or slide his chrd in order to gain entry. The card contains the authorization code. By sliding or swiping the card, the employee is allowing the
system to "read" the authorizing data on the card. Thus, the computer system has acquired
identifying information about a physical object-namely the card and its authorization

information.
65. These scanning applications are auto-identification systems and acquire information about the item being purchased, such as price or brand, by deciphering product data in
barcodes affixed to items.
66. By one estimate, the amount of time spent at supermarket checkout is five minutes
and thirty-four seconds, with three minutes of that time spent waiting. GAVIN CHAPPELL
ET AL., AUTO-ID CENTER, AuTro-ID IN THE Box: THE VALUE OF AUTO-ID TECHNOLOGY
IN RETAIL STORES 10 (2003) http://www.autoidlabs.org/uploads/media/ACN-AUTOIDBC006.pdf (citing a 1999 Envirosell study).
67. In such a system, the checkout device will be able to read each item's RFID tag
from several feet away and complete the purchase. See id.
68. See Jennifer E. Smith, You Can Run, But You Can't Hide: Protecting Privacy From
Radio Frequency Identification Technology, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 249, 257 (2007).
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a data processing system. 69 Tags are typically tiny microchips with antennas that are capable of storing a small amount of data. 70 They are placed
on an object to be identified and are able to broadcast identifying data. 71
Readers are devices which can query the tags to find out what information is stored on the microchips. 72 Readers may "interrogate" a product's
tag to find information such as an item identification number, location,
item type, price, producer, or date of manufacture. 73 Since the readers
and the tags communicate using radio waves, information can be transmitted over distances of several feet.74 Readers are generally connected
to a data processing system. Once the reader has obtained identifying
information about the item from its tag, it can contact the data processing
system to obtain more detailed information about the item or to update
75
the item's status in the system.
RFID's major improvement over existing auto-identification technologies is its ability to read information about items at a distance and
through barriers. 76 Current technologies such as barcode scanning and
magnetic strip reading require physical or visual proximity of the reader
to the item. RFID readers broadcast queries and wait for tags within
range to respond. 77 Radio waves can penetrate barriers, such as walls or
boxes, that current technologies cannot. 78 Using an RFID system, it may
be possible to identify items within a closed box, behind the walls of a
locked room, or to locate lost items within a crowded warehouse. Since
RFID readers talk to tags using radio waves, there need not be physical
or visual contact between item and reader in order for communication to
79
take place.

69. Tags are formally known as "transponders," and readers are formally known as
SARMA, WEIS & ENGELS, supra note 62, at 4.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

"transceivers."

73. See id.

74. The distance from which RFID readers can communicate with tags depends upon
the type of technology used. At the current time, low-power tags can communicate over a
maximum distance of 15 feet, whereas battery-operated tags can communicate over distances of 100 feet or more. See KLAUS FINKENZELLER, RFID HANDBOOK: RADIO-FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION FUNDAMENTALS
AND
APPLICATIONS 6-9, 21 (Rachel
Waddington trans., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2d ed. 2003); SARMA, WEIS & ENGELS, supra
note 62, at 4.
75. See FINKENZELLER, supra note 74, at 199-218.
76. Id. at 6-7. For example, cards with magnetic stripes are often parts of auto-identification systems. Information about the card, such as an account number, is communicated
to a computer system, such as an Automated Teller Machine ("ATM"), through the process of swiping. The obvious disadvantage of a system like this is that it requires physical
contact between the card and the reader. Physical contact may lead to degradation of the
magnetic surface or may be impeded by dust or scratches. Id. at 15.
77. See SARMA, WEIS & ENGELS, supra note 62, at 4.
78. See id.

79. There are some limitations on RFID ability, which will be discussed below. For
example, RFID tags are limited in their operating range. Additionally, readers and tags
may not be able to communicate with one another through certain materials, such as metal
or certain types of liquids. Id. at 5.
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STRUCTURAL PRIVACY RIGHTS AND RADIO
FREQUENCY

IDENTIFICATION

As this Essay has asserted, under the constraint-rights framework, society implicitly relies upon non-legal constraint mechanisms to prevent unwanted behaviors. In the privacy domain, there is a dependency upon
assumptions about the inability or difficulty of engaging in certain behaviors. Such conduct is constrained by the costs of acting: the technological
state of the world.8 0 Accordingly, this subpart anticipates a technique for
more precisely predicting the privacy interests that will be vulnerable to
an emerging technology. This technique is to focus upon the costs that a
particular emerging technology tends to reduce. In that way, it is possible
to more comprehensively and accurately determine which structural privacy rights will be threatened by the emergence of a given technology.
This subpart will apply this concept, focusing upon the costs that RFID
technology reduces, which will in turn make clear the behaviors that will
no longer be effectively regulated by structural constraints upon RFID's
widespread diffusion.
For illustrative purposes, we will assume that RFID technology has
been widely diffused and adopted. In a world prior to the emergence of
RFID, acquiring identifying information about items behind physical barriers was costly or impossible. For example, identifying the contents of a
closed briefcase, a sealed box, or behind a wall was difficult, requiring
expensive equipment or physical intrusion. This rendered such behavior
effectively inhibited in a pre-RFID world. In terms of the constraintrights framework, this unwanted behavior was regulated by latent structural constraints-the real-world costs of engaging in this conduct. There
is, by the default state of the world, a structural privacy right to be free
from this investigatory activity, since presumably society is depending
upon these structural barriers to constrain the privacy-violating behavior.
The emerging technology dynamic outlined previously predicts that any
privacy interests that are dependent upon the existence of these particular costs are vulnerable in a world in which the widespread use of RFID
greatly lowers these costs.
As a simple example, assume that there is a privacy right to the secrecy
of the contents of one's pockets, or of a closed briefcase.8 1 In a world in
which most items have embedded RFID tags which are capable of being
read through physical barriers, the structural costs which had constrained
such intrusive behavior-the physical barriers-may no longer be effective regulators.8 2 Thus, the diffusion of the emerging technology has effectively caused a rights-shift, in which the default state of the world has
80. See discussion supra Part I.B.

81. Of course, like all privacy rights, there are certain limitations to the right, such as
when one is required to enter detection equipment in order to board an airplane. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding an x-ray scan at an
airport constitutional under the administrative search doctrine).
82. For the purposes of this example, we assume that there are no compensating technological barriers to reading RFID tags, such as encryption or tag disablement.
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changed from one in which a particular behavior is constrained by default
to a world in which the behavior is no longer constrained by default. Put
within the terms of the constraint-rights framework, this can be seen as
analogous and tantamount to the abrogation of a hypothetical legal rule
which prohibited the behavior.
Another illustration will highlight the different dimensions of structural
privacy rights. Under one conception of privacy's role in the modern information society, preserving the secrecy of data prevents the innocent
from having data about them taken out of context.83 One characteristic
of RFID as an emerging technology is an increased possibility of data
being misconstrued in this way; this is because RFID lowers the costs of
revealing previously secret data. It is easy to imagine scenarios where, in
the RFID-diffused world, incorrect inferences are drawn about individuals innocently possessing illicit materials. For example, we can envision a
high school principal who has just confiscated a RFID-enabled, illicit
magazine from a student. In today's world, the subsequent disposal of
the magazine could proceed as a matter of course, with discretion for
both the student and the administration. But one can easily imagine, in
the RFID-diffused world, an individual using an RFID reader to detect
the materials within the principal's briefcase and drawing incorrect, misleading, and perhaps damaging conclusions from this piece of information. While similar dangers existed in a pre-RFID world, RFID lowers
84
the structural barriers that had previously constrained such behavior.
A final example involves the aggregation and analysis of information
about items purchased and possessed by individuals. In some RFID implementations, each tag has the capacity to have its own unique identifi85
It
cation number known as an Electronic Product Code ("EPC").
would therefore be possible to distinguish every item with an RFID tag of
a particular type of good from one another. By contrast, most non-RFID
systems can typically cannot distinguish identical items of the same type
from one another. To such systems, identical items of the same typesay, two cans of the same type of soda-are indistinguishable.
A particular structural cost-the inability to distinguish between identical items of the same type-is therefore potentially reduced by the RFID
technology. Behaviors which had been solely regulated by this structural
constraint are no longer constrained in the RFID-diffused world. For example, in the pre-RFID world, it is difficult to link an individual to a
particular item purchased after the point of sale. Thus, someone who encounters a discarded soda can could not, simply by scanning the can's
83. Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063, 2065 (2001)
("Privacy's function, in this story, is not to protect the presumptively innocent from true
but damaging information, but rather to protect the actually innocent from damaging conclusions drawn from misunderstood information.").
84. For example, in a pre-RFID world, an individual might see the principal carrying
the illicit magazine and also draw incorrect conclusions. But since RFID potentially
makes it more difficult to conceal things, the opportunity for such intrusions is greater.
85. See SARMA, WEIS & ENGELS, supra note 62, at 10.
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UPC code, determine who had purchased that particular soda, since
every can of soda has an identical UPC code. From the perspective of a
UPC code, one can is indistinguishable from another, since every can of a
particular type of soda receives the same identifying number. However,
in the RFID-diffused world, the cost of uniquely identifying items is lowered, and each individual soda can in a case could have its own individual
identifier. Thus, RFID technology could potentially enable the ability to
link an individual item to a purchaser simply by reading the item's unique
EPC code. This is another illustration of a structural constraint no longer
effectively inhibiting a particular behavior due to the cost-lowering effects of an emerging technology such as RFID.
All of these examples illustrate a major point of this Essay-that the
choice of a particular mechanism used by society to constrain behavior
makes a difference. Different regulatory mechanisms vary across characteristics such as the ability to reliably constrain behavior and their vulnerability to erosion through exogenous factors such as changes in
technology. This is especially true in the privacy context, where privacy
interests are frequently protected by structural constraints and are vulnerable to erosion by emerging technologies such as RFID.
IV.

USING THE CONSTRAINT-RIGHTS FRAMEWORK TO
REDUCE SOCIAL COSTS IN PRIVACY LOSS

As this Essay has suggested, a theoretical construct such as the constraint-rights framework can be useful in revealing rights that policymakers could otherwise easily overlook. In particular, latent structural
constraints are subtle, non-obvious regulators of behavior.
From a social perspective, there are important benefits to affirmatively
viewing these constrained behaviors as structural privacy rights. First,
this conceptualization allows policymakers to identify potentially serious
privacy losses very early in the technological diffusion process, before an
emerging technology achieves widespread adoption and erodes structural
constraints. 86 Since this theoretical framework focuses upon latent costs
as the regulators of certain activities, policymakers can anticipate privacy
losses simply by examining emerging technologies and the costs that they
will tend to reduce. Today, the public debate over privacy and emerging
technologies is dominated by those scenarios that are readily imaginable
by policymakers and interested parties.8 7 There does not, however, appear to be an explicit, overarching principle for systematically predicting
the full range of eroding privacy interests, including those that are implicit. The structural-cost principle-the notion that focusing upon
86. See Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REv. 921 (2006) (providing for a thoughtful discus-

sion of technology diffusion and privacy issues).
87. See, e.g., PrivacyActivism, RFID Position Statement of Consumer Privacy and
Civil Liberties Organizations (Nov. 20, 2003), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RFIDposition.htm; Electronic Privacy Information Center, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Systems, http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
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emerging technologies and the costs that the technologies will reduce as a
means of anticipating potentially undesirable behaviors that will be enabled-is one such guide that policymakers could systematically use. Importantly, this principle allows policy makers to anticipate vulnerable
privacy interests that have never been previously identified in the public
debate.
It is important that policymakers have the ability to identify vulnerable
privacy interests early in the diffusion process of emerging technologies.
As indicated, the widespread diffusion of an emerging technology effectively causes a rights-shift with respect to privacy interests protected by
latent structural constraints. The default state of the world changes from
one in which the privacy interest is protected to one in which it is no
longer protected due to exogenous factors such as the cost-lowering effects of technologies. The structural rights abstraction can serve as a predictive construct. By permitting the identification of implicit and
nonobvious privacy interests at an early stage, policymakers could potentially mitigate the overall social costs that might result by relatively sudden shifts caused by rapidly emerging technologies. For example,
policymakers might choose to overlay another regulatory device-law,
structure, norms, or markets-in parallel with existing structural constraints, at a time before full technological diffusion occurs. With the dissipation of the structural constraint, there would be one or more other
regulatory mechanisms in place. Such parallel regulation could effectively prevent the erosion of a structural privacy interest by keeping the
unwanted behavior regulated to some degree, even after the loss of the
structural constraint following the emergence of a disabling technology.8 8
To illustrate this point using RFID: If legislators are concerned about
the erosion of the privacy right in linking individual purchases to particular individuals, they could enact an explicit legal rule prohibiting such
linking behavior before RFID technology becomes widespread enough to
permit it. More creatively, legislators could regulate this behavior using
explicit structural constraints. Thus, lawmakers could require intentional
technological modifications that mimicked the latent structural constraints that protected the privacy rights in the pre-RFID world. 89 This
might take shape in a legislative requirement that the ability to link
purchases to individuals be constrained via data encryption embedded in
every RFID tag. 90
88. However, as this Essay has noted, different constraint mechanisms regulate in different ways and are able to constrain behaviors more or less effectively. Thus, the replacement mechanism may not always be equivalent in regulatory ability to the original.
89. See LEssIG, supra note 3, at 146-60.
90. Scholars have been advocating a similar position to this in the copyright context.
Fair use, a structural right, has been subject to erosion by emerging technologies. Several
scholars have advocated countering this erosion by actively implementing fair-use rights
via technological measures. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 56 (2001) (advocating
discretionary access to publications in a rights management database that would constitute

fair use). Others have argued for similar technological protection rights preserving mea-
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Like legal rules, structural constraints are both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive relative to the behavior that society wishes constrained.
Due to limits in precision, legal rules necessarily over-regulate, prohibiting a small amount of behavior that is benign or beneficial in order to
constrain a larger amount of undesirable behavior. 91 Since structural
constraints are similarly over-inclusive, the loss of a structural constraint
via the diffusion of an emerging technology enables some benign behavior along with unwanted behavior. As emerging technologies such as the
Internet have demonstrated, it is often impossible to predict, a priori,
which uses of the technology will maximize social welfare. To simply
mimic the structural constraints via another regulatory device may not be
a socially desirable outcome: the emerging technology may enable socially beneficial behaviors that society may not want to constrain.
This suggests that the principle of "least constraint" should generally
govern: as a rule of thumb, society should continue to prevent only those
particular behaviors that are known to be undesirable, and permit the
rest. 92 Thus, it is important to distinguish analytically between the structural mechanism-the costs that were constraining particular unwanted
behaviors-and the unwanted behaviors themselves. For example, it is
helpful to imagine a world in which latent structural constraints governed
a particular behavior. Because of the implicit and imprecise nature of
these regulations, it is likely that unwanted activities are constrained
along with certain desirable activities. However, following the emergence
of a cost-lowering technology, these structural constraints no longer govern, and both socially undesirable and socially desirable activities are possible. The structural cost view thus allows policymakers to hone in
precisely on the unwanted behaviors and constrain only those, while allowing beneficial behaviors enabled by the technology to persist. This
can be thought of conceptually as the disaggregation of individual undesirable behaviors from the larger group of behaviors that were constrained structurally prior to the emergence of the cost-lowering
technology.
The framework suggests that the structural privacy rights analysis can
be roughly summed up in three questions: What cost is a particular
emerging technology reducing? What unwanted behaviors are currently
sures in the privacy context. See, e.g., Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with
Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 288, 305-14 (2001).
91. Again, a speed limit is the paradigm example of a legal rule that is over-inclusive
relative to the behavior it seeks to regulate. If the underlying behavior that a speed limit
seeks to prohibit is unsafe driving, then most speed limits are going to prohibit some driving that is safe for the sake of administrability of the rule. A speed limit that is sixty-five
miles per hour might be a good proxy for a safe driving speed; clearly, however, a vehicle
traveling safely at sixty-seven miles per hour could be safe under many circumstances, but
would be constrained under the rule.
92. This is a similar to the argument that has been advocated in favor of so-called net
neutrality, in which it is suggested that, a priori,it is too difficult to predict which uses of a
technology will be the most beneficial. Therefore, the platform with the least restrictions
should generally be seen as the best. See, e.g., Brett Firschmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257, 293-98 (2007).
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constrained by those costs through existing latent structural mechanisms?
and What alternative regulatory mechanisms can society use to continue
to constrain the unwanted behaviors, while permitting other enabling
uses of the emerging technologies? This conceptualization permits
policymakers to more precisely target unwanted behaviors for regulation,
while permitting benign activities enabled by emerging technologies.
V. CONCLUSION
93
Society uses multiple mechanisms to regulate behavior besides law.
Any device that imposes a cost can be considered a regulator, but in general, the major non-legal regulatory mechanisms are markets, norms, and
structure. 94 Throughout this Essay, I have emphasized that society sometimes implicitly relies upon these alternative regulators in the place of law
to prevent unwanted behaviors.
Some legal theorists define a negative right in terms of certain behaviors that are constrained relative to the rights-holder. The reason for this
formulation is precisely because it emphasizes the fact that a negative
right is the liberty to be free from particular behaviors of others.9 5 In
certain circumstances, existing, non-legal constraint mechanisms already
inhibit particular unwanted behaviors. The existence of such regulators
occasionally obviates the need for society to create an explicit legal prohibition of that behavior. The goal of this Essay has been to suggest that in
those instances where society relies upon an existing alternative constraint mechanism as a substitute for law, it is conceptually useful for
policymakers to query whether that constrained behavior is analogous to
a legal right. This is a generalization, as applied to constraints outside of
the legal context, of the above notion that a negative right is created
whenever a law prohibits certain unwanted behaviors of others in relation
to the rights-holder. This extension of the notion of rights to other regulatory mechanisms outside of law is the basis of a model that I described
as the constraint-rights framework.
I noted that different constraint mechanisms, whether law, markets,
norms, or structure, vary considerably in terms of their ability to reliably
constrain behavior and in their relative vulnerability to various exogenous factors. I compared these various constraint mechanisms across a
set of attributes in order to determine the means by which one mechanism might be a weaker or stronger regulator than another. In particular,
I explored the strengths and vulnerabilities of structural constraints because, in the privacy context, a great deal of unwanted behavior is constrained, not explicitly through law, but implicitly by alternative
constraint mechanisms such as latent structural constraints. Since many
behaviors that society would consider privacy-violating are prohibited by
latent structural constraints, and because latent structural constraints are
93. See discussion supra Part II.
94. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
95.

See Hohfeld, supra note 6, at 30-32.
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dependent upon costs imposed by the technological state of the world,
structural privacy rights-privacy rights protected solely by structural
constraints-are vulnerable to erosion by emerging technologies which
lower behavioral costs and enable previously costly activities.
This slow erosion of structural privacy interests occurs repeatedly as
new, cost-lowering technologies become prevalent. At some point, technologies become so widespread that, effectively, a shift in the distribution
of societal entitlements may occur. In terms of the constraint-rights
framework, behaviors which had been previously constrained solely by a
non-legal mechanism become unconstrained by default. If the underlying
assumptions which formed the basis of policy action or inaction suddenly
change, then policymakers should expressly confront the issue of shifting
entitlements, rather than allowing exogenous factors to passively settle it.
This sudden change in privacy status can result in unnecessary social
costs. I suggested that policymakers can avoid the social costs incurred
by the sudden nature of the privacy loss by examining particular emerging technologies through the lens of the constraint-rights framework. In
other words, by analyzing emerging technologies in terms of the costs
that they are lowering and the particular structural privacy rights that are
protected by those costs, it is possible to comprehensively predict privacy
losses well before they become socially problematic. Policymakers can,
by distinguishing between the costs and the unwanted behaviors, use one
or more of the other regulatory mechanisms to constrain privacy-violating behaviors while permitting any beneficial behaviors enabled by the
emerging technologies. Moreover, from a rhetorical standpoint, those
facing the imminent loss of structural rights can frame the issue in terms
of preserving existing rights, rather than the solicitation of completely
new rights.
In sum, the intention of this Essay has been to suggest that it is theoretically useful to explicitly label the implicit societal dependencies upon
non-legal regulatory devices, especially when such a relationship is functionally comparable to the one surrounding a legal right, and to demonstrate the practical implications of this conceptualization in terms of
societal protection of implicit privacy rights.
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